The Big Mac index

THE ECONOMIST's Big Mac index is based on the theory of purchasing-power parity: in the long run, exchange rates should adjust to equal the price of a basket of goods and services in different countries. This particular basket holds a McDonald's Big Mac, whose price around the world we compared with its American average of $4.20. According to burgernomics the Swiss franc is a meaty 62% overvalued. The exchange rate that would equalise the price of a Swiss Big Mac with an American one is SFr1.55 to the dollar; the actual exchange rate is only 0.96. The cheapest burger is found in India, costing just $1.62. Though because Big Macs are not sold in India, we take the price of a Maharaja Mac, which is made with chicken instead of beef. Nonetheless, our index suggests the rupee is 60% undercooked. The euro, which recently fell to a 16-month low against the dollar, is now trading at less than €1.30 to the greenback. The last time we served up our index in July 2011, the euro was 21% overvalued against the dollar, but it is now just 6% overvalued. Other European currencies have also weakened against the dollar since our previous index, notably the Hungarian forint and Czech koruna, which have fallen by 23% and 16% respectively. Six months ago both currencies were close to fair value, but they are now undervalued by 37% and 18%.

For the full data set see here.

Prada is not Walmart

INDIA, if you believe the government, will be a land in which Starbucks and Prada thrive but where foreign firms will be prohibited from selling onions. It does not seem like much of a cause for celebration, but the announcement on January 11th that foreign “single brand” retailers could own 100% of their operations in India was meant to show the reform process was on track. It followed a debacle late last year when the government first announced that not only would single brand retailing be opened up, but foreign supermarkets would be allowed to operate in India too—and then was quickly forced into a U-turn on the latter promise after facing a rebellion within its own ranks and from the coalition parties it relies on in parliament.

By emphasising that at least the single brand bit of retail reform is still on track, the government hopes to show the world that India is still open for business. But this is a meek change indeed. Single brand retailers, such as fashion chains, were already allowed to own 51% of their operations. And the political stink of last month is likely to scare those who are not already present because swathes of the political class have been shown to be populist and hostile for foreign firms. Individual states may still choose to override the central government’s rules. Lastly, the reform comes with a large catch: 30% of what is sold must be supplied from cottage industries in India. If you are selling a uniform product worldwide—a sofa or handbag made in China—that is a major hassle.

The hope must be that India is on a journey to the right place, stumbling along the way. Perhaps the supplier rule will eventually be dropped, the argument goes. Maybe reluctant states will learn the error of their ways and open up too, after seeing the success of single brand retailers in other states. And maybe, after seeing an influx of investment from single brand retailers, the political climate will change and it will be easier to pass a reform that lets in supermarkets in too.
Interviewed in Delhi earlier in January a government mandarin insisted that the supermarket reform was not dead. Yet all of this seems half hearted. India is a hard enough place as it is for foreign firms to make profits. Adding in a fickle polity just makes things worse. And it is a rather sorry day for progress when a rule tweak to allow Starbucks or Prada to own not 51%, but 100%, of their shops is presented as a meaningful economic reform.

America’s next CEO?

Paint it grey
Start with the advantages. The most important fact about Mr Romney is that he is a non-ideological man who did something that America needs a lot more of. In 2002 he was elected to govern Massachusetts, normally a Democratic stronghold. He passed a version of health-care reform that is at once his proudest achievement and his biggest liability. Back then a system based on obliging everyone to buy private health insurance was a conservative idea, and Mr Romney did a good job of working with a hostile legislature to get it passed. (Today, his party viscerally opposes Mr Obama’s health reforms, which are closely modelled on Mr Romney’s; such are the twists of politics.) He also turned round Massachusetts’s finances, just as he had earlier righted the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics. Mr Romney needs to make these successes count for more than they have so far. Once the primaries are over, and America’s independents rather than the Republican Party faithful become the electorate to win over, he may be able to.
Second, Mr Romney has something that the president and his Republican rivals sorely lack: business experience. For 25 years he made himself and the management consultancies BCG and Bain a lot of money by making companies more efficient which, yes, sometimes means firing people, but also drives economic growth (see article). So far, Mr Romney has done a poor job of defending himself against attacks which are really aimed at the creative destruction which is the essence of capitalism itself. He says he created a net 100,000 jobs during his time at Bain. That figure is impossible to prove, but he could do more to argue that the benefits outweigh the costs. His task has not been helped by disgraceful attacks from fellow-Republicans on corporate restructuring.
Third, Mr Romney seems sure-footed. It is hard to think of a single misstep in this campaign. He may be wooden, but no scandal has ever attached to him. His family life is impeccably monogamous and progenitive. Those who have worked closely with him tend to admire him. On both the economic and the foreign-policy sides, he has already put together impressive and above all sensibly moderate teams.
The debit side of the ledger
A useful list, to be sure: but can it outweigh the negatives? Mr Romney’s pragmatism has an inconvenient flip side: no one is quite sure where he stands. The Republican base does not think he is reliable on such things as gay rights and abortion. That will not matter so much to independents (who will probably also accept that any Republican has to say a few mad things to win a nomination). But people have to trust a president on the main issues, and, despite publishing a long economic manifesto, Mr Romney remains vague over how a lot of it is to be accomplished.

Explore our interactive map and guide to the race for the Republican candidacy

It is not at all clear how he would reform America’s ruinously expensive health-care and pensions systems. His views on what he wants to do about America’s 12m illegal immigrants are also unsettlingly gnomic. And where he has been clear, he has sometimes been wrong: his insistence that, on day one of his presidency, he will brand China as a currency manipulator represents dangerous pandering to populists. His pledge to cut federal spending to no more than 20% of GDP, a sop to his party’s fiscal extremists, would also be dangerous if applied as quickly as he implies.
Mr Romney will have other problems in wooing the electorate. He would be the richest candidate ever to win a big-party nomination and he reeks of privilege. His father was a governor as well, and he himself studied law at Harvard. On the other hand, Mr Obama is a millionaire several times over, can give a fair impression of having come from the planet Vulcan, and also studied law at Harvard. Mr Romney’s lack of charisma is a problem; but perhaps America wants fewer soaring speeches and more pragmatic restructuring plans.
Mr Romney’s last difficulty is one that should not be a problem at all. He is a Mormon and, despite Mormons’ protestations to the contrary, a third of Americans do not consider them to be Christians. There is not much Mr Romney can do about this. He could explain the Mormons’ extraordinary missionary work, but he can hardly risk saying that it is not really any more incredible that God communicated His plans to man in upstate New York in 1820 than He did in Palestine in 0AD. We recall, however, that America was for decades “not ready” for a Catholic president, or for a black one. Eventually, Americans thought better of those attitudes. Prejudice would be a silly reason for the Republicans to reject a man who offers their best chance of beating Mr Obama.

Gold, God and forgiveness

 Gold, God and forgiveness

DO BANKERS inevitably go to hell? What many people today merely hope will come to pass was for Christians in the early 1400s a matter of faith. After all, the Bible, like the Koran, was explicit in its condemnation of lending money at interest, the basis of most banking operations. So in many parts of Christendom moneylending was left to Jews. In several northern cities of medieval Italy, however, ingenious Christians started to find ways round the banking ban. Their contrivances, though legal, were not popular with the church, which held that usurers, by charging for the duration of a loan, were not trading in goods but in time, and this was God’s.
The prospect of an eternity of hellfire was particularly acute in Florence, since it was here that the foundations of modern banking were being laid. As it happened, Florence was also witnessing the first stirrings of an extraordinary flowering of the arts. Before long guilt-ridden bankers were commissioning great works of religious art in the hope that they might after death escape the damnation that the scriptures foretold. In this way were the birth of the international financial industry and that of the Renaissance intimately connected.

 

The connection might perhaps be reduced to a single word, whether patronage, or atonement, or Medici. A
longer, and far more pleasurable, elaboration can be found in text, pictures and objects at the Palazzo Strozzi in Florence, where an exhibition devoted to “Money and Beauty” continues into 2012. Subtitled “Bankers, Botticelli and the Bonfire of the Vanities”, it explores the motives of Florence’s bankers in their artistic commissions; the reactions of churchmen to rich Florentines’ displays of luxury and wealth; and the effects of both penitential patronage and ecclesiastical reproach on the works of art that, throughout the 1400s, or Quattrocento, tumbled forth from Florence like coins from a slot machine.
In the background of the exhibition are the Medici, the wool-traders turned bankers who held sway over the Florentine republic in its golden age under Lorenzo the Magnificent, and who produced popes and queens and Tuscan grand dukes until the last of the dynasty died in 1737. Their grip was interrupted by the invasion of Charles VIII of France in 1494, which brought in its wake the brief rule of Girolamo Savonarola, the austere Dominican friar from Ferrara who berated the Florentines for their luxuries, gambling, carnivals, and particularly their wanton paintings, which made “the Virgin Mary look like a harlot”. He called for children to spy upon their parents, prostitutes to be chastised, sodomites burned alive and irreligious frivolities prohibited. Hence the great Bonfires of the Vanities in the Piazza della Signoria in 1497 and 1498, when countless works of art, as well as cards, books and dresses, went up in flames.
Sandro Botticelli, a central figure, was not one of the artists who flung their paintings onto the fires, but he nevertheless fell under Savonarola’s spell, as his later works clearly show. Gone, in these, were the sensuous depictions of idealised beauty seen in his early paintings, such as the “Birth of Venus”. Now Botticelli’s figures were more likely to bear agonised expressions of intense piety, as in “Madonna and Child with the Young St John”.
In between came works like “The Calumny” (pictured above). This shows Midas on his throne, receiving the counsels of Ignorance and Suspicion, with a hooded Envy clasping the hand of Calumny, who in turn, with Deception and Fraud attending, is dragging the unidentified victim by the hair, while Penitence turns hopefully towards stark-naked Truth. Though not overtly religious, the sentiment is morally correct and therefore Savonarola-suitable, as is the turbulent mood, so far removed from the sumptuous lyricism of Botticelli’s earlier, mythological works. When those were made, as the chronicler Giorgio Vasari noted over half a century later, he worked happily for many Florentine families painting “very nude women”.
“Money and Beauty” was proposed in 2006, just after the birth of the foundation that runs the Palazzo Strozzi, a 15th-century building in the middle of Florence built by mercantile rivals of the Medici. Five years of incubation, however, have only improved the show’s timeliness, allowing reflections not just on the role of bankers in general but even on some familiar banking terms whose origins are Tuscan. The most notable may be “risk”, which derives from Tuscan rischio, the amount considered necessary to cover costs when lending money, ie, a euphemism for interest. Another is “florin”. First coined in Florence, florins circulated widely in Europe for centuries—in Britain until 1971—and may yet perhaps make a post-euro return.
It is not just its timing, though, that makes this show so successful. Its themes, and the abundance of artefacts and paintings on which the curators could draw, allow every point to be illustrated with a wonderful work of art: a panel commissioned by the mint; an altar painting showing Filippo Strozzi, who paid for it, almost as prominently as the entire Holy Family; keys, locks, letters of exchange; an account book pointing to the perils of sovereign default (three banks had gone bust when Edward III of England reneged on large loans); a codex containing the sumptuary laws that forbade flashy clothes and ostentatious funerals. (Even Fra Angelico—see next story—so pious he could not paint a crucifix without tears running down his cheeks, chose to depict the Virgin’s obsequies in the manner of an unashamedly opulent 15th-century Florentine funeral.)
The images are merciless. Miserly bishops are shown being whipped with their own moneybags; St Anthony causes a usurer’s heart to be found in a strongbox; a moneylender meets the figure of Death. Balancing these are numberless images of devotional scenes, the Nativity, the Madonna and other religious figures. And also shown are the events with which Lorenzo’s magnificent era ended: Charles VIII’s entry into Florence, Savonarola preaching against luxuries in a city that derived so much wealth from making them, and the fundamentalist friar’s own execution in the very square in which the Bonfires of the Vanities had been held. This is the visual telling of a tale of beauty and bloodshed, lucre and licentiousness, morality, hypocrisy and propitiation.
The telling is not all the work of the Quattrocento. The exhibits benefit enormously from the commentaries of two curators, Ludovica Sebregondi, a specialist in the religious art of the Renaissance, and Tim Parks, a British novelist and author of “Medici Money” (2005). While one puts the exhibits in their art-historical context, the other explains the social and wider significance. With different styles, and sometimes conflicting views, they add considerably to the pleasure of the show.
And should today’s bankers take heed? Though usury has long since lost its power to inspire any penitential effort among Christians, modern moneylenders are accused of other sins: Pope Benedict calls for “moral renewal” in Italy and the Church of England agonises about the godlessness of the City of London. Yet most bankers seem to dread damnation in the hereafter as little as censure in the here and now. Too bad. Without the fear of God, they are unlikely to pay for a new Renaissance.

 

Reimagining the future

“
THAT city will, in the course of time, become the granary of the world, the emporium of commerce, the seat of manufactures, the focus of great monied operations,” predicted DeWitt Clinton, governor of New York in 1824. He was speaking about the effects of the Erie Canal, which connected the Great Lakes to the Hudson River. Originally derided as “Clinton’s folly”, the canal helped to open up the west, allowing New York to benefit enormously from an explosion of trade. Within 15 years of the opening, New York was the busiest port in America, moving more than Boston, Baltimore and New Orleans combined. The plan to open an applied sciences university campus in New York City, reckons Seth Pinsky, who heads New York’s Economic Development Corporation, is an “Erie Canal moment”.
The city’s embrace of high-tech has already begun. Tech clusters have emerged in Manhattan’s Flatiron District and Brooklyn’s Dumbo, home to firms like STELLAService and Etsy. Venture-capital firms and angel investors have been looking at New York more seriously than they once did. Henry Blodget, of Business Insider, notes “the financing ecosystem has also gotten very well developed, from late-stage private equity right down to angel investing.” Some $1.2 billion was invested by venture-capital firms in New York in 2010. The Big Apple even overtook Massachusetts in venture-capital funding for internet and tech start-ups, making it second only to Silicon Valley. And in the third quarter of last year, it surpassed it in venture capital in all categories. Between 2005 and 2010 employment in New York’s high-tech sector grew by nearly 30%. Google alone has about 1,200 engineers in the city.

Much of this growth has been organic, but there has been some help from City Hall. Since 2002 the city has set up more than 40 projects to help the biotech sector and helped create a network of incubators supporting start-ups in that area. It also established a $22m municipal entrepreneurial fund, the first of its kind outside Silicon Valley. A year ago Michael Bloomberg, a tech entrepreneur before he became New York’s mayor, called on universities to pitch plans to develop and operate a new tech campus in New York in exchange for access to city-owned land and up to $100m in public money.
New York received seven proposals from 17 top institutions, including Stanford University which did so much to create Silicon Valley. Almost 6,000 companies, including Google, Hewlett-Packard and LinkedIn, trace their beginnings to Stanford. But Stanford withdrew from the competition last month, days before the mayor announced the winning proposal, which came from Cornell, an Ivy League university, and its partner Technion, an Israeli technology institute. The latter is considered to be one of the driving forces in Israel’s tech industry. It helped turn Israel from a country of orchards to one of semiconductors. Some 4,000 start-up companies are located around its campus.
The two bodies have plans to build a $2 billion 2m square feet (610,000 square metres) campus on Roosevelt Island, one subway stop from mid-town. Cornell and Technion hope to have a temporary facility up and running as soon as this autumn and complete their permanent home by 2017. The bid had huge support from Cornell alumni, including a $350m gift from Charles Feeney, who made his fortune through the Duty Free Shopping Group. That is one of the largest donations in the history of American higher education.
According to the city’s analysis, over the next 30 years the campus will generate more than $7.5 billion in economic activity, with 600 companies spinning out of the new school directly; these are projected to create 30,000 jobs. Some 20,000 construction jobs will also be created, not to mention about $1.4 billion in extra tax revenue. And it should help quench the never-ending demand for qualified engineers. The mayor has not ruled out naming additional winners. And some of the losing plans will go forward regardless. So New York could soon have several applied sciences campuses. Look out, Silicon Valley.

Behind every cloud, another cloud

A decade ago, Britain came through the dotcom bust with barely a scratch, thanks to a consumer-credit boom and deficit-financed public spending. Those days of easy credit are long gone: consumers are paying down their debts and government finances are deep in the red. The economy’s best hope lies with export demand, but this is growing scarce. The economic outlook for America, Britain’s biggest single-country export market, looks dark. The euro zone, where half of Britain’s exports go, is at risk of imploding.

In September the IMF cut its forecast for Britain’s GDP growth in 2012 to a sluggish 1.6%. Even that may soon look too optimistic; the Economist Intelligence Unit, a sister company of The Economist, expects 0.7% (see “The world in figures”). It seems far likelier that the economy will disappoint than offer a pleasant surprise. The British policy brass feels vindicated for its wariness about the single European currency but scepticism will be no protection against the fallout from the euro’s troubles. Britain is the one big country outside the currency zone that is heavily exposed to euro trouble through its trade and financial links.

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The continuing crisis in Europe will have implications for Britain’s deficit-cutting plans. The logic behind the government’s fiscal austerity is that the bond market’s ire can turn quickly from errant euro-zone countries to others (such as Britain) that have large budget deficits. But as Europe’s woes deepen, the harm done by sticking rigidly to the fiscal plan is likely to prove greater than any damage done by deviating from it.
That is in part because money pulled from the euro zone’s trouble-spots has to go somewhere. Some of it will end up in British government bonds, which will look among the soundest of the rich-country credits (admittedly not a healthy peer group). Meanwhile, a dearth of export orders for British companies will push the government to adopt measures in support of the economy. Deep cuts in the state’s day-to-day running costs, including reductions in welfare benefits, will go ahead as planned. But the Treasury will find itself having to finance new capital projects to make up for a shortfall in aggregate demand.
The economy will be lucky to avoid at least one quarter of contraction during 2012. The unemployment rate will be stuck above 8%, the highest rate since the mid-1990s. But two factors militate against a deep downturn.
First, businesses anxious about the economic outlook and fearful of a renewed tightening of credit conditions tend to trim their stocks, postpone planned investment and stop hiring new employees. But this tendency to conserve cash will be limited in the coming months because many British companies have already been piling up rainy-day money. The excess of corporate income over spending has risen above 4% of GDP. That offers a degree of protection against savage cuts in stocks, investment and jobs.
Easy does it
A second helpful factor is the prospect of lower inflation. It is set to fall steadily from a peak of 5% to around 2% by the end of 2012, as vat and energy-price increases drop out of the annual rate (see chart). That will bring some relief to hard-pressed consumers, who suffered a large fall in real income during 2011. Lower inflation will also make it easier for the Bank of England to justify a more aggressive dose of “quantitative easing” (QE)—boosting the money supply by buying government bonds. Because investors will be increasingly reluctant to finance commercial banks, amid worries about their exposure to the euro zone’s sovereign-debt problems, the Bank of England will find itself compelled (with Treasury backing) to buy long-term bonds issued by banks as part of its QE programme.

The pound is set to fall further against the dollar

London will look a cheap holiday destination for Americans next summer but a lot of Europeans are likely to stay at home. The pound is set to fall further against the dollar in the early months of 2012, in part because of Britain’s exposure to the euro zone but also because the dollar rises against other currencies when the world is in trouble. At the low point for the global economy in March 2009, the pound fell to $1.38. It could easily fall as far again in 2012 given how fearful investors are likely to become.
Only the euro looks more vulnerable to a fall. But it will not be much comfort for Britons that some other European economies will be in even worse shape than their own.

How to run the euro?

How to run the euro?

• er during the euro crisis: the markets and the politicians. In 2012 the battle will become a lot more complicated, as the politicians splinter into factions. It sounds dangerous—and it is—but thrashing out political arguments is an essential part of bringing the crisis to an end.

Amid the banks’ plunging shares and the soaring yields of government bonds, it is easy to lose sight of the political questions being asked of Europe. Markets have forced Europe’s troubled economies to confront austerity and reform, but politics will determine how they do so. Markets have demanded that Germany and other creditor nations finance a rescue, but politics will decide what they demand in return. Markets want a revamp of the euro’s governance, but politics will ordain how energetically the European Union embraces federalism.

Austerity and a rescue are now under way, though a descent of Greece into anarchy could yet throw them off course. But the third element—renovating the governance of the euro—is still highly uncertain. In 2012 Germany’s Angela Merkel and her fellow euro-zone leaders will set out the sketches for that design.

Try this for a blueprint

If you were sitting down with a blank sheet of paper, you would advise the euro zone to complement its one-size-fits-all monetary policy by pooling sovereignty and creating new institutions. You would set up a European mini-IMF (call it an EMF) with enough funds to tide over troubled countries as they adjusted their economies. A pan-European banking regulator and a bail-out fund could ensure that large European banks were not at the mercy of their vulnerable sovereign borrowers. To stop the markets from picking off weaklings, you might organise centralised borrowing—in which all countries jointly stood behind the debt of each government. And, to stop spendthrift governments from exploiting these mechanisms, euro-zone countries would agree to submit their fiscal policies to the say-so of everyone else.

It amounts to a blueprint for the United States of Europe. And it is utterly beyond reach.

For starters nobody can agree on which central authority should hold all these new powers. France and Germany would refuse to boost the European Commission, which they mistrust. Smaller countries and Germany’s constitutional court would refuse to endow an ad hoc intergovernmental council. Many national leaders heartily detest the European Parliament.

Moreover, many governments are nervous about other euro-zone countries having a say about their own public spending. And the entire EU was scarred by the eight-year-long attempt to restructure the union, first by writing a new constitution—rejected and abandoned—and later by repackaging the constitution into the Lisbon treaty, which limped into force in 2009. You do not find much appetite in Brussels for a repeat performance.

Shape up, for the euro’s sake

Where does that leave the redesign of the euro? Euro-zone governments have agreed that leaders will meet at twice-yearly summits. They have set up a proto-EMF and a European Banking Authority. And they have agreed to monitor the economies of euro-zone members in a souped-up Stability and Growth Pact.

New sanctions might require a new treaty

But more is needed, especially with sanctions. Some could be enforced at the level of the nation. Euro-zone members might have to write caps on deficits and debt into their constitutions, or create independent offices of statistics and budget sustainability, rather as they must have an independent central bank today.

Ultimately, though, new sanctions might require a new treaty. But new treaties take a long time. Countries can weigh them down with their own agendas (Britain, for instance, wants to repatriate powers even though it is not a member of the euro zone). And referendums can reject treaties (just ask the Irish).

These difficulties have answers and the EU has had more than enough practice in fashioning compromises out of unpromising ingredients. But if the euro zone gets it wrong in 2012, it will be laying the foundations of the next currency crisis.